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REFLECTIONS ON THE VALUE OF
TRUTH
Frederick Schauer*
I
IN PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,' the Supreme Court
held that in a "private figure" defamation action governed by
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,2 the plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity.' Philadelphia Newspapers generated little attention,
largely because its fundamental premise-that falsity is the essence of an action for defamation-appears to have been shared
even by the four dissenting Justices." Once Gertz had established
that even private figures were required to prove at least negligence
in order to recover against media defendants, the issue finally resolved in PhiladelphiaNewspapers seemed almost a foregone conclusion. Implicit in the concept of negligence (how are we to think
about negligent truth?), and a fortiori in the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,5 was the idea that falsity was an essential element of the tort of defamation, at least
after that tort was constitutionalized. 6 If falsity was a necessary
condition for the lack of constitutional protection, then, conversely, truth seemed to be a sufficient condition for that protection to attach.
It was not always so. Not only did the common law of defamation treat truth as but an affirmative defense, making it possible for a plaintiff to recover without ever establishing that the of*

Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of Gov-

ernment, Harvard University. I am delighted to acknowledge the invaluable support of the
Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on The Press, Politics and Public Policy.
1. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
2. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
3. 475 U.S. at 776.
4. See Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEo. L.J. 1519, 1528 n.37 (1987).
5. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
6. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73-75 (1964).
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fending statement was not true, but in actions for criminal libel,

truth was not even an absolute defense. In order to maintain a
successful defense of truth in a criminal libel action, the defendant
was required to show both that the statement was true and that it
was published for the public benefit.7 Consequently, the common
law recognized that there could be "injurious truth,"8 a concept
that post-New York Times and post-Gertz defamation law ap-

pears to treat as virtually oxymoronic.
If contemporary actions for defamation have been transformed into actions for negligent or malicious falsehood, 9 with falsity as an element of the cause of action, then where does that

leave the law respecting invasion of privacy? Interestingly, the Supreme Court has never addressed directly the central question of
the constitutional contours of an action based on the publication

of truth about someone who did not wish that truth to be disclosed. There have been decisions with respect to false light inva-

sion of privacy, 10 but this tort "bears a striking resemblance to
libel."1 The issue of appropriation of a likeness or performance

with commercial value, an issue that has just once been before the
7. See id. at 67-70; N. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 111-12, 118-19 (1986); Kelly, Criminal Libel and Free
Speech, 6 U. KAN. L. REV. 295, 328 (1958)); Spencer, Criminal Libel in Action-The
Snuffing of Mr. Wicks, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 60, 70 (1979).
8. N. ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 118 (quoting a letter to Josiah Quincy written in
Massachusetts in 1823 by Harrison Gray Otis).
9. Malicious falsehood is a cause of action in most civil law jurisdictions, with the
elements of that action being (1) the falsity of the words spoken; (2) a dishonest or improper motive; (3) damage; and (4) a causal link between the false statement and the
damage. For a discussion of malicious falsehood, see P. LEWIS. GATLEY ON LIBEL AND
SLANDER § 301 (8th ed. 1981).
10. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
11. Entin, Privacy, Emotional Distress, and the Limits of Libel Law Reform, 38
MERCER L. REV. 835, 843 (1987); see Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 310
N.C. 312, 313, 312 S.E.2d 405, 407 (rejecting the false light tort as an independent cause
of action), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984); Epstein, A Tastefor Privacy? Evolution and
the Emergence of a NaturalisticEthic, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 665, 668 (1980) ("false light is
but a small corner of the tort of defamation that in no sense needs its own niche in the law
of privacy"). But see Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 956-63 (1968)
(arguing that embarrassing or "false light" cases should be protected under privacy rather
than defamation theory). See generally Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The
Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364 (1989) (arguing that courts should restrict or
reject the false-light tort because it lacks theoretical justification); Zuckman, Invasion of
Privacy-Some Communicative Torts Whose Time Has Gone, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
253 (1990).
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Court,1 2 involves a different set of concerns as to which the idea of
truth or falsity seems largely immaterial. And although central
questions about the constitutional protection of the publication of
true private facts were potentially on the agenda in both Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn"3 and Florida Star v. B.J.F.,4 the

decisions actually rendered turned out to be based primarily on
the public nature of judicial proceedings and public records.
As a result of the Supreme Court's long-standing avoidance
of the issue, actionable publication of truth is an area in which the
relevant standards have been developed largely by the lower
courts. Piecing together a prevailing view from a combination of
cases, commentary, and semi-authoritative sources such as restatements is always problematic, but the law now appears to be

such that a plaintiff must prove three elements in order to recover
in an action for invasion of privacy based on the public disclosure
of truth: 15 First, the information disclosed must previously have

12. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
13. 420 U.S. 469 (1975); see Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97
(1979).
14. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
15. See generally Woito & McNulty, The Privacy Disclosure Tort and the First
Amendment: Should the Community Decide Newsworthiness?, 64 IOWA L. REV. 185, 187
(1979) (tracing "historical development of the right to privacy and the common law public
disclosure action"); Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren &
Brandeis'sPrivacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983) (advocating the abandonment of
the common law right to privacy action because of its history of failing adequately and
uniformly to compensate plaintiffs).
The tort under discussion is the one that Prosser referred to as "[p]ublic disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff." Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383,
389 (1960). Prosser's terminology, which persists, is unfortunate because the term "embarrassing" refers to only one type of disclosure, a type central neither to the modern understanding of the tort nor to my analysis of it. Suppose a picture is published showing a
person performing an excretory function. The publication, violating a firmly entrenched
social convention, see Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 489 (1968), would be extremely
embarrassing (the word "mortifying" also comes to mind), but can hardly be said to convey to any viewer some previously unknown fact, and thus will change only slightly the way
the subject of the photograph is subsequently treated by others. See Neff v. Time, Inc., 406
F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (disallowing recovery for photograph of plaintiff with fly
open because plaintiff encouraged the photographer, thereby implying consent). But contrast the situation where the disclosure of some fact about a person provides the audience
with new information about the subject, information which changes the way the audience
subsequently views and treats that subject. For example, when in Sidis v. F-R Publishing
Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940), the disclosure of information converts a recluse into the object of intrusive attention, or when in Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1984), or many other
contemporary "outing" incidents, the disclosure of sexual orientation changes the way
someone is seen by friends, relatives, colleagues, or constituents, the word "embarrassing,"
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been private;'" second, the disclosure must have been "highly of-

fensive to a reasonable person"; 17 and third, the facts disclosed

must not be "of legitimate concern to the public,"'" or, as it is

more commonly put, "newsworthy."'

9

Interestingly, this current standard, especially the usually dispositive "newsworthiness" component, bears some resemblance to

the now-discredited "public benefit" qualification of the defense of
truth in criminal libel actions, for both recognize that the truth of
a statement is not a sufficient condition for protecting its public
disclosure. This may mean that the tort of invasion of privacy, in
this pure sense of disclosure of accurate private information, cannot survive New York Times and Gertz. ° The Court, however, is
although technically correct, hardly captures the core of the concern. To capture that concern there is a shorter and even more common word--"harm." We must be careful to
avoid being influenced by the trivializing word "embarrassing" into undervaluing some
harms from the perspective of the subject.
This might be the appropriate time to mention the similar use of the word "offense" to
trivialize (sometimes properly and other times not) what someone else perceives to be a
harm. When we describe as "harm" the effect of a racial epithet on a member of an ethnic
minority but as "offense" the effect of flag-burning on a disabled veteran or Robert Mapplethorpe's photographs on a Fundamentalist Christian we.express our view about the gravity of someone else's harm. That is often an appropriate thing to do, but it is often not, and
it remains useful to recognize the way in which hard questions about that evaluation are
often begged by using just this kind of language. More directly related to this symposium is
Professor Post's idea of "civility rules." Post, The Social Foundationsof Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 957, 962-63 (1989) [hereinafter
Post, Social Foundations];Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberationand Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 601, 626-46 (1990) [hereinafter Post, ConstitutionalConcept]. These rules "of deference and demeanor," Post, Social Foundations,supra at 962, which often involve no "actual injury," id. at 963, suffer from much the same distorting use of trivializing rhetoric.
There are indeed many civility rules in any organized society, just as there are many harms
done by some members to others. But to put invasions of privacy at the outset into the
former class rather than the latter begs with language the very question that is under
discussion.
16. E.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1045, 201 Cal.
Rptr. 665, 667 (1984).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D(a) (1976).
18. Id. § 652D(b).
19. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
998 (1976); see Logan, Tort Law and the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 51 U.
PITT. L. REv. 493, 548-53 (1990).
20.
However, in light of later constitutional cases, and given the general rationale
articulated by the Supreme Court over the years, the state should always recognize that truth is a defense in a defamation or right of privacy action-unless
the plaintiff publishes confidential information which he himself has stolen. Even
in such cases, the right of action is not really based on defamation but on publishing and attempting to benefit from knowingly stolen materials.
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quite unlikely to so hold. If then some reason exists to suppose
both that the Court will uphold some of the tort and that the

Court will be correct in doing so, then the common law idea of
injurious truth retains some plausibility when evaluated in light of
the concerns of modern privacy law. Moreover, whether the idea
that there are truths whose publication is sufficiently injurious to
be actionable is ultimately justified or not, at the very least this
idea seems to be reflected in the limiting element of "newsworthi-

ness" in the current legal standard.
This possibility-that the truth of a proposition is not a suffi-

cient condition for the legal protection of its dissemination-not
only undergirds the newsworthiness standard of contemporary invasion of privacy doctrine but also explains much of the analogous
"matters of public concern" standard that distinguishes Gertz
from Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.2" Al-

though the viability of a media/nonmedia distinction remains
technically open after Philadelphia Newspapers,22 it has been
barely breathing since Dun & Bradstreet, supplanted by a stan-

dard that asks, in a case involving defamation of a private individual, whether the subject is "on matters of public concern. 2 s Since
the entire framework of defamation law after New York Times is
based on the strategic protection of falsity in order to maximize

the dissemination of truth,24 a distinction based on "matters of

J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

940 (3d ed. 1986); see

Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty
and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 TEx. L. REV. 611 (1968) (judicial application of first
amendment standards may effectively eliminate right to privacy claims). Although hardly
expressing normative agreement with the conclusion, Justice White also has noted the existing doctrinal fragility of actionable publication of truth. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 55253 (White, J., dissenting).
21. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
22. 475 U.S. at 779 n.4; see LeBel, Reforming the Tort of Defamation An Accommodation of the Competing Interests Within the Current Constitutional Framework, 66
NEB. L. REV. 249, 280-81 (1987).
23. 472 U.S. at 758. Compare Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (decided
before Dun & Bradstreet using essentially the same standard). Moreover, treating speech
on a matter of public concern as different in kind appears to undergird the distinction
between NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, reh g denied, 459 U.S. 898
(1982), and cases such as FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768
(1990), and Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988). For a
critical commentary on the standard and most of its manifestations, see Estlund, Speech on
Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990).
24. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340-42; Ocala Star Banner v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 301
(1971) (White, J., concurring); see Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and

704
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public concern" necessarily means that there will be less strategic

protection of falsity on matters not of public concern. This in turn
must presuppose that the dissemination of truths not of public
concern is less valuable than the dissemination of truths of public
concern. Under this view, contemporary invasion of privacy law is
but the more extreme version of a view already built into defamation law, that the truth of a proposition is one thing, and the social

value of its propagation is quite another.
II

To distinguish between the truth of a proposition, such as the
proposition that John Doe is on welfare25 or that Richard Roe
owes someone money26 or that Jane Smith was long ago convicted
of a crime,2 7 and the social value of its dissemination requires further exploration of the relationship between truth and social value.

Traditionally, it has been assumed that truth is necessarily valuable, and it is that assumption that I want to expose to closer
scrutiny.
The proposition that truth is necessarily and always valuable
has been implicit in centuries of free speech theory. Specifically, a
long tradition has grounded freedom of speech on the argument
from truth-the argument that the governmentally unimpeded

clash of opposing positions will further the search for truth. 2 s The
argument from truth is not without difficulty. At times it collapses

Decency, 65 VA. L. REV. 785 (1979); Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment:
Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. REV. 685 (1978).
25. See McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa. 147, 308 A.2d 888 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 970 (1974) (refusing to grant newspaper access to public assistance rolls
maintained by the state and county).
26. See Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927), discussed in Post,
Social Foundations, supra note 16, at 979-81 (poster advertising customer's debt placed in
window could constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy).
27. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr.
866 (1971) (publication of plaintiff's involvement in eleven year old truck hijacking could
constitute an invasion of privacy).
28. See W. BAGEHOT, The Metaphysical Basis of Toleration, in 2 LITERARY STUDIES 422, 425 (3d ed. 1884); J.S. MILL. ON LIEERTY 35-36 (2d ed. 1863); J. MILTON. AREOPAGITICA (J. Suffolk ed. 1968); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 881-82 (1963); cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.
...); International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, C.J.) ("truth
will be most likely to emerge if no limitations are imposed upon utterances."), affd, 341
U.S. 694 (1951).
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into a Meiklejohnian argument for self-government, in the sense
that some truths, perhaps especially political truths, might be de-

fined in terms of democratic processes, so that an argument for
open deliberation as a means to finding truth collapses into an argument for open deliberation as a self-standing good. 9 Even if
truth is defined independently of a deliberative process, such that
governmental nonintervention is seen primarily as a way of identi-

fying truths not defined in deliberation-dependent terms, then it
becomes apparent that the argument from truth presupposes an

empirical relationship between the process of open deliberation
and the identification of truth, a relationship which is problematic
at best.30 Still, let us put aside these conceptual and empirical
29. This appears to be the most charitable and least question-begging interpretation
of Holmes's statement that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). If instead, Holmes is read as saying that all truth is defined in terms of the product of unimpeded public deliberation, it becomes difficult to say
that astrology is false now or that the flat-earthers were wrong in 1491. And if we then
attempt to respond by defining truth in terms of some ideal speech situation, as Habermas
and his followers would have it, the inquiry appears circular, for we are still left wondering
what is so good about an ideal speech situation whose value seems to be the identification
of truth defined in terms of the very process that defines it. See J. HABERMAS, THEORY AND
PRACTICE

(J. Vertiel trans. 1974); Habermas, Wahrheitstheorien,in

WIRKLICHKEIT UND

211 (H. Fahrenbach ed. 1973). And if instead the value of the ideal speech
situation is a normative ideal of equal and rational deliberation for its own sake, see R.
REFLEXION

ALEXY A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: THE THEORY OF RATIONAL DISCOURSE AS
THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 101-37 (N. MacCormick trans. 1989), then this goal,

admittedly valuable, is not one that is necessarily congruent with the identification of truth.
Given that the focus of this article is primarily on factual truth, my failure to discuss
arguments based on broad-based skepticism about the possibility of factual truth can be
taken as some, though not conclusive, evidence of my view about the soundness of such
arguments. As long as we distinguish objectivity, in the sense that the truth of a proposition
is observer-independent, from certainty, in the sense that it is impossible for a certainly
true proposition to be discovered to be false, then the argument from truth, as applied to
factual propositions, needs no more than the ability to recognize the fact asserted as more
likely true than not, for example that the earth is (more or less) round and that many Jews
were killed in Nazi concentration camps. See Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 119, 132-33 (1989). See generally Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and
Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 658-63 (1987) (suggesting that the "truth rationale" for free speech relies on the supposed nonexistence of
objective truth as an excuse to prevent suppression of speech that may generally be accepted as false).

30. See F.

SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH:

A

PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY

15-34 (1982);

Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 974
(1978) ("The assumptions on which the classic marketplace of ideas theory rests are almost universally rejected today. Because of this failure of assumptions, the hope that the
marketplace leads to truth, or even the best or most desirable decision, becomes implausible."); Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 130-41. To put the point somewhat differently, it may
be important to remember that the marketplace of ideas is, after all, a market, and thus,
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problems, and accept for the sake of argument that a society will
identify more truths under a regime of freedom of speech than
under any of the available alternatives.
So what? Why is it good for a society to have more truth?
Traditionally, the answer to this question has been taken to be
self-evident, such that any policy that produces more truth is eo
ipso a policy worth pursuing. This view, however, emanates in
large part from the assumption in almost all of the free speech
literature that the opposite of truth is falsity. If the pursuit of
truth is the alternative to the pursuit of falsity, then it has appeared that the former must necessarily be preferred. Even this is
open to question. If truth is an ultimate, irreducible, and noninstrumental value, then of course it is preferable to falsity by stipulation and nothing more need or can be said. However, if truth is
instrumental to some deeper good, such as happiness, utility, dignity, stability, human well-being, the general welfare, or whatever,
then the instrumental relation between truth and that to which it
is instrumental is empirical and not definitional, and therefore capable of being false in some or many cases. Given the deep-seeded
racism in the United States, I would consider it an open-question
whether the United States would be better off if everyone in the
country believed (falsely) that George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton were African-Americans. I am not convinced that the country would be, on
balance, hurt if American men believed (falsely) that cigarettes
and alcohol cause baldness. I am also willing to entertain the possibility that the (false) belief of most Americans that their banks
have well in excess of fifty percent of deposits available for immediate withdrawal is an essential condition for the successful operation of the banking system in the United States, which is in turn
(possibly) instrumental to economic stability, which is in turn
(possibly) instrumental to the general welfare of the people of the
United States."1 At the very least, therefore, it appears that if

much that we think about markets is more applicable to the marketplace of ideas than is
often acknowledged. See C. MACKINNON, The Sexual Politicsof the First Amendment, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 206 (1987); Coase, The Market
for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 384, 389 (1974) ("There is no
fundamental difference between [the market for goods and the market for ideas] and, in
deciding on public policy with regard to them, we need to take into account the same
considerations.").
31. Nothing in the foregoing examples is designed to take a position about the consequences of establishing some institution to determine truth and falsity. Of course, the bene-
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truth is instrumental, then more truth, or even less falsity, is not
in every case instrumental to what it is that truth is instrumental
to.
As with most instrumental goods, however, it is still possible
to recognize the instrumental value of truth to something deeper
without maintaining that that relationship holds in every instance.
The posited relationship between truth and some foundational
value might thus be probabilistic rather than universal, just like
the relationship between exercise and good health. But even assuming that claims about the value of truth are claims of empirical tendency rather than logical inexorability,32 and thus assuming
that "truth is generally (if not necessarily) better than falsity, the
abstract preferability of truth to falsity is somewhat beside the
point, for the object of our attention is not so much truth as it is
knowledge. That is, the argument from truth is essentially an argument from knowledge. The value asserted by the argument
from truth is the value of having people believe things that are in
fact true. Truth, after all, is a property of a proposition and has
little to do with human action or belief. The argument from truth
is best recast as an argument from knowledge in order to focus on

fits of falsity might be overwhelmed by the harms consequent upon establishing some institution to determine which falsehoods are socially desirable, see Rawls, Two Concepts of
Rules, 64 J. PHIL. 3 (1955), but this does not defeat the point in the text that falsity is not
necessarily bad, and truth is not necessarily good. As to the latter, consider whether to
disabuse a dying person of her false belief, which now brings her great happiness, that her
son has never been in trouble with the law.
Thus, my concern, not just here but in general, is that the lawyer's typical "Who's to
decide?" challenge is a rhetorical device that conflates two distinct questions. The first
question is whether some distinction can be drawn between alternatives, at least within the
discursive context in which the distinction is offered. That is, do you, the reader, and I, the
writer, agree that there is a distinction between x and y? In some cases we may not, or we
may agree that there is no distinction. But, if we agree that there is a distinction, then the
next but distinct question is about the circumstances, if any, under which some institution
might be empowered to draw x/y distinctions. It is a mistake to conclude from the inadvisability or impossibility of creating such institutions that there is no drawable distinction.
Similarly, it is equally inappropriate to infer from the putative undesirability of a governmental institution established to determine truth, or to determine the value of truth, that
distinguishing truth from falsity or determining the value of truth is impossible.
32. In saying that truth is not necessarily good, I make a logical claim that is, of
course, not rebutted by the citation of instances finding truth good and falsity bad. In
saying that truth is not necessarily foundationally valuable, I do not deny that truth may
be, and frequently is, valuable when measured according to the values that truth is instrumental to; it is thus a simple logical mistake to rebut my "some truths are not valuable"
claim by observing that some truths are. Rather, the "some truths are not valuable" claim
can be defeated only by establishing the proposition that "all truths are valuable," and this
proposition is not established by showing that some truths are valuable.
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the way in which the argument is directed towards human action
rather than propositions in the abstract.
If instead of considering truth we are considering knowledge-justified true belief-then the opposite or failing case is no
longer limited to falsity. A person or a population can fail to have
justified true belief in three different ways: one's belief can be unjustified; one's belief can be false; and one can have no belief at
all. This last is of particular interest here, because it can now be
seen that although the opposite of truth is falsity, one of the opposites of knowledge is simply ignorance, or the lack of belief. Although one way to fail to know is to believe something that is
wrong, another way is to know nothing at all. Understanding this
distinction allows the question about truth as an instrumental
value to be rephrased in terms of knowledge: Is it necessarily or
generally the case that knowledge is better than ignorance? 33
When the question is so rephrased, it then appears that what
is at issue is not whether it is better (for you? for me?) that you
believe (correctly) that I am an academic rather than (falsely)
that I am a professional wrestler, but whether it is better that you
believe (correctly) that I am an academic than that you have no
beliefs at all about me. And what if I were in fact a professional
wrestler? Or a religious fundamentalist? In these cases I might be
better off if you had no knowledge at all. And maybe so would
you, and so would society. Think of what it means to say, "I wish
I hadn't known that." It is possible that in most cases it is better
to have a true belief than a false one. It is also possible, however,
that in a nontrivial number of cases it is no better to have a true
belief as opposed to no belief whatsoever.
At this point it may be useful to take a slight Bayesian digression. Perhaps my assumption that the opposite of knowledge
can be ignorance is excessively simple. In some instances, what
appears at first to be no knowledge at all is in fact a set of prior
probabilities based on previous experience. For example, when I
meet someone at a party I tend to believe, at some level of consciousness, that they are not carrying a weapon, that they have
not recently been convicted of a felony, that they cheat but only

33. The term "ignorance" is a bit pejorative for my purposes (although Rawls's "veil
of ignorance" helps in some circles to ameliorate the negative connotation), but the less
pejorative synonyms provided by my thesaurus--"unknowingness," "unacquaintance,"
"unfamiliarity," "unawareness," and "incognizance"-are far too infelicitous to be used
anywhere other than in this footnote.
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slightly on their income taxes, and, in the circles in which I travel,
that they prefer hiking to bowling and Liszt to Liberace. From
this perspective, all subsequent information I receive does not so
much fill an epistemological void as provide new information with
which I then adjust my previous beliefs. Thus, the good Bayesian
may challenge at least the frequency of cases in which my assertion of an epistemological void is sound.
This Bayesian perspective is undeniably partially correct, and
I certainly do not want to deny the extent to which much of our
interaction with the world takes place against a background of
prior probabilistic epistemological assumptions. Still, not every
topic about which I receive knowledge is a topic as to which I had
prior beliefs, at any level of consciousness. Thus, the Bayesian perspective does not capture the entirety of human interaction, or,
more accurately, human noninteraction. When, at the supermarket checkout counter, I glance at a publication informing me that
some person has lost 200 pounds by faithfully adhering to a diet
of bat guano, this knowledge does not replace a previous belief so
much as add to my stock of beliefs. The new knowledge merely
replaces what had previously been epistemological empty space. In
learning this information I have not modified a previous belief (except possibly the belief that no one had ever lost 200 pounds on a
bat guano diet), but have simply added a new piece of information
to my informational repertoire. Even acknowledging the Bayesian's point, it remains the case that frequently the gain in knowledge is simply an addition rather than the substitution of the true
for the false. In such cases, the argument that this addition of
knowledge is only sometimes and only contingently valuable must
be taken seriously.
III
From a perspective that recognizes that some gains in knowledge might not be gains simpliciter,a4 the argument from truth as
an argument for freedom of speech and freedom of the press is
parasitic on a theory of value or a theory of the good as to which
knowledge is instrumental. Moreover, it appears highly likely that
this instrumental relationship between knowledge and some ultimate good is contingent rather than necessary. When Mill in his

34. The logical point made supra note 32 applies throughout all that follows, and not
only to the particular issue of truth in which it is first introduced.
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argument against censorship assumed that true belief is valuable, 5 he was either making the contingent utilitarian claim that
more true belief will produce more utility (or happiness, or
whatever) or he was showing himself as a nonutilitarian consequentialist who believes that possession of true belief is a conse-

quence, the increase of which is a good in itself. My purpose here
is not to engage in exegesis or interpretation of Mill, so I will not
pursue this further. 6 But the former interpretation seems more

empirically contingent than Mill appears to admit, and the latter
is not only in tension with some of Mill's other views, but also
requires the kind of demonstration that few consequentialists have
37

ever attempted.
The view that knowledge is instrumental to, say, utility or the
general welfare or dignity could be taken as making an empirical

but (contingently) universal claim. It could be, for example, that
every increase in knowledge represents an increase in utility or
general welfare or dignity. But this seems plainly false. As a number of the examples above were designed to suggest, it is clear that
many increases in someone's knowledge come at the expense of
35. See J.S. MILL, supra note 28, at 38-44.
36. There is some discussion of these issues in an exchange between H.J. McCloskey
and D.H. Munro. McCloskey, Liberty of Expression: Its Grounds and Limits I, 13 INQUIRY 219 (1970); Munro, Liberty of Expression: Its Grounds and Limits II, 13 INQUIRY
238 (1970). 1 have also benefited from D. Brink, Happiness, Liberty, and Rights in Mill's
Utilitarianism (1990) (unpublished manuscript).
37. Interestingly, one of the most prominent consequentialists to address the issue
concluded to the contrary. "[K]nowledge, though having little or no value by itself, is an
absolutely essential constituent in the highest goods [such as aesthetic beauty], and contributes immensely to their value." G.E. MOORE. PRINCIPIA ETHICA 199 (1965). It is unclear what kind of claim Moore was making in describing the relation between knowledge
and ultimate good as "absolutely essential." It is a spectacular understatement to suppose
that in a footnote I can offer a theory of the good. Let me, therefore, be satisfied with the
claim that any consequentialist theory of morality or rationality must have some designation of what ultimate consequences count in evaluating the desirability of an action. If
those consequences do not, as with utilitarianism, include knowledge, then knowledge is
valuable only insofar as it increases utility, a relationship I would describe in terms of a
tendency rather than a unity. Alternatively, there could be a consequentialism that treated
knowledge as the single ultimate value, but I know of no such theory. Another possible
theory is one that treats knowledge as one of a plurality of ultimate values, the increase of
any of which is a good in itself. It is this last theory that looks most promising, but, like
Moore, I remain skeptical. Therefore, I do not, as Professor Marshall suggests I might,
move from the view that knowledge is instrumental to x to the view that x is instrumental
to something else, which in turn may be instrumental to knowledge. Comment of Professor
William P. Marshall, Case Western Reserve Law Review Symposium: The Right to Privacy One Hundred Years Later (Nov. 17, 1990). I maintain instead that the array of
irreducible goods most likely does not include knowledge, and that the very irreducibility of
irreducible goods precludes an instrumental account of why those goods are good.
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someone else's well-being or dignity. I find it wildly implausible to
suppose that in every case the well-being of the recipient of the
new information is increased by more than the well-being of the
subject is decreased as a result of the disclosure. Here, however, it
is important to distinguish those activities that are, on balance,
undesirable from those that have no value at all. Under one view,
all increases in knowledge are valuable, but some may also cause
disvalues outweighing the value produced. Yet under another
view, some increases in knowledge simply have no value at all.
Resolving this issue is not crucial here, for the difference is of
consequence only under a simple hedonistic consequentialism pursuant to which one person's increase in knowledge at someone
else's expense is analogous to the value in happiness someone
achieves by punching someone else in the face. My claim is only
that increases in knowledge that admittedly increase the pleasure
of the knower are necessarily valuable only under a theory that
treats pleasurable punchings of others as valuable, and that under
any nonhedonistic theory of the good it is implausible to maintain
that increases in knowledge are necessarily valuable.
If we look at the more plausible view that these issues should
be considered not on the basis of the universal characteristics of
individual items or events, but rather in terms of the tendencies of
types or classes, then it seems reasonable (but still needing some
demonstration) to suppose that more knowledge, as a class, will
benefit the well-being or happiness or utility or dignity of the recipients of that knowledge, as a class, more than it will detract
from the well-being or happiness or utility or dignity of the subjects of that knowledge, as a class. But even supposing this to be
true, difficult questions remain about the definition of the relevant
class. Defining the classes in terms of all subjects of knowledge,
all knowledge, and all recipients of knowledge, the beneficial tendencies of more knowledge seem clear. If, however, we subdivide
the class, and that is exactly what privacy law seeks to do, then it
now becomes much more plausible that we could identify subclasses within which the tendencies will go in the opposite direction.3 8 Once we acknowledge that not every increase in knowledge
38.

It is important to distinguish here the theoretical possibility of an empirically
LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965); M.

justifiable sub-class, see D.

SINGER, GENERALIZATION IN ETHICS: AN ESSAY IN THE LOGIC OF ETHICS, WITH THE

RUDIMENTS OF A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

(1961), from the possibility that some

theoretically and empirically distinct sub-class might still not be usable in practice. See
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is for the good (however good is defined), we must be open to the
possibility that the instances in which knowledge is not for the
good might be collected into a usable and internally coherent
class. Moreover, such a class could be based on tendency rather
than universality, in the sense that the tendency of more knowledge within the class might be for the worse even if some items of
increased knowledge within the class would be beneficial.
These complications are avoided if knowledge is viewed simply as a good in itself. Returning to this possibility in light of
some of the privacy issues we are now discussing, the view that
knowledge is a good in itself seems little more plausible than the
view that knowledge is universally instrumentally good. Consider
again in this regard the public disclosure of a private person's status as a welfare recipient, or as a recovering alcoholic, or as someone with seven toes on one foot, or as someone who attended two
meetings of the Communist Party in New York in 1934. The first
reaction might be that these disclosures are simply not valuable,
and therefore that more knowledge is not an intrinsic and ultimate
good. But one response to this reaction would be to distinguish
between the mere existence of some value and value of all things
considered. This distinction allows the conclusion that such disclosures, with their consequent increase in someone's knowledge, are
in fact valuable, but that the harm of the disclosure outweighs the
value, so that, on balance, it is better if there is no disclosure.
Under this view every increase in knowledge is valuable, but that
value is only one component of a complete calculus of value-or
of harms and benefits-pursuant to which all of the relevant values and disvalues must be aggregated to produce a final determination of value.
This approach may be appealing, but the examples suggest
that some increases in knowledge simply have no intrinsic value.
(Remember, we are not now discussing knowledge as instrumentally valuable and thus not now discussing an increase in knowledge as instrumentally increasing, say, happiness.) Therefore, examples such as the unwanted disclosure of unexposed physical
deformities demonstrate the implausibility of treating the increase
of knowledge as an ultimate good worth pursuing in its own

Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1985); Trianosky, Rule-Utilitarianism
and the Slippery Slope, 75 J. PHIL. 414 (1978); see also supra note 31 and accompanying
text.

1991]

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

right.39 These examples demonstrate precisely that it is not neces-

sarily or ultimately the case that an increase in knowledge by
some agent is good either for that agent40 or for society.

Thus, it appears that the value of knowledge is first of all
agent-relative in the sense that what is valuable for one agent may
not be valuable for another, or that the value of one agent's
knowledge may be offset by the negative value for the second
agent because the first agent has that knowledge. In addition,

knowledge is now seen to be only contingently valuable. It is empirically related to some deeper value by a relationship that is
probabilistic and not universal, and thus possibly nonexistent either in some cases or in some class of cases.
IV

This discussion might be put quite differently by restating the
common slogan that "knowledge is power." That phrase, however,
is most plausible if it is contended only that one of the things that
knowledge is instrumental to is power, and that power, while itself
instrumental, may at times be more directly related to irreducible
goods than is knowledge.

In thinking about this claim, let us define "power" as including the ability in fact to control one's environment, including but
not limited to controlling other agents. To say that knowledge is
instrumental to power, therefore, is to say that knowledge of that

environment, including knowledge about other agents, is likely to
(the "is" in "knowledge is power" seems plainly to be an empirical claim) increase the ability of the possessor of that knowledge
to see both the obstacles and the opportunities in a potentially

39. In thinking of this example, I would not rule out the possibility that if we are
thinking instrumentally and not ultimately, then some unwanted disclosures might contribute to the general welfare by helping to remove unjustified negative reactions to certain
traits or activities. One of the arguments for involuntary disclosure of someone's sexual
orientation or status as a rape victim, for example, is that negative reactions to someone on
the basis of sexual orientation or status as a rape victim are simply wrong. Thus, involuntary disclosure contributes to producing a world in which the stigma is eliminated. Thinking instrumentally, however, requires weighing the extent of the involuntary sacrifice with
the likelihood and extent of the benefit, a calculus that needs a bit more than mere assertion. That is, although it is clear that it would be better if one's sexual orientation or status
as a rape victim were nonstigmatizing, it is less clear that involuntary disclosure will get us
there, and less clear how long it will take us to get there.
40. Cf. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence
in PoliticalInstitutions, 88 MICH. L. REv. 917 (1990) (political institutions may at times
make better decisions with less information).
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power-stifling environment. Having a map and a weather forecast
increases my control over the physical environment, and, in the
same way, having knowledge about what motivates, annoys, embarrasses, or angers someone else increases my control over them.
To consider privacy of a quite different form, think about the loss
of control that comes when someone has a data bank including my
physical profile, my spending habits, and the details of my life and
my family.
The slogan "knowledge is power" is commonly employed by

those who want some item of knowledge or want more knowledge
in general. From this perspective, knowledge, which we have seen
is instrumental rather than ultimate, is one of the weapons desired
by those who desire more power. If we step back from the slogan
as manifesto, however, we can see the message of knowledge as
power as a strong recapitulation of the position that possessing
information tends to empower the possessor at the expense of

someone else. Although it may be a mistake to think of power as a
zero-sum game, in the sense that some agent's possessing more
power means that some other agent possesses less, it is still the
case that this is the necessary implication for power relations between or among people.4 1 Insofar as I have more power over you,

you have less over me, and insofar as some factor changes the
power relationship between A and B to A's benefit, then it is necessarily the case that the power relationship is changed to B's

detriment.

42

41. There is interesting and important literature on power, and my failure to discuss
it in detail here should not indicate that I think it irrelevant to further consideration of the
relationship between speech, knowledge, social power, and political power. Among the more
important recent works are C. FRIEDRICH, MAN AND His GOVERNMENT: AN EMPIRICAL
THEORY OF POLITICS (1963); C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY (1950); H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY: A FRAMEWORK FOR
POLITICAL INQUIRY (1950); A. MCFARLAND, POWER AND LEADERSHIP IN PLURALIST SYSTEMS (1969); N. POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY (1980); Partridge,
Politics and Power, 38 Phil. 117 (1963). For a discussion of some of the classic theories of
power, see J. PLAMENATZ, MAN AND SOCIETY (1963). Note also that the Hohfeldian
power, a power which allows one person to alter another's legal position, W. HOHFELD.
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (W. Cook ed.
1923), comes quite close to capturing the view of knowledge as power. That is, someone
with knowledge about me is likely, because of that knowledge, to have a greater ability to
alter my position in some way. Hohfeld, however, was discussing legal power, and it is
possible that a legal power might or might not produce power in fact, and that power in
fact might come from many factors other than the exercise of a legal power.
42. By talking of benefit and detriment I assume here that having more power over
someone else is good for the holder of the power. In fact I believe that to be false, but why
I believe that, and the implications of that position, have very little to do with the main
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Consequently, it is often the case that by possessing information about B that B does not want known, A will have greater
power over B and, concomitantly, B will have less power over A.
Consider in this regard the knowledge by an employee that her
employer has overcharged some government agency, or the knowledge by an employer that an employee has tested the job market
and come up with nothing. Consider also a negotiation in which
one party has discovered the best offer that the other party is ultimately willing to make. In other contexts the relevant power relationship is not between A and B, but between A and C, some third
party, although information about B is at issue. A newspaper that
prints a story about someone without that person's consent rarely
does it to increase their power over the subject. Still, insofar as
the newspaper has the ability to conscript someone into being an
instrument of their relations with others (including their readers
and other newspapers), much the same issues are present. A's
ability to conscript B against B's will into A's fight with C is every
bit as much power over B as is the more direct situation in which
C is not part of the scenario.
This perspective sheds quite a different light on New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan." Seeing the case as involving the relation
between knowledge and power conforms it more closely to the
views of Alexander Meiklejohn, on which the decision is commonly thought to be based."" In developing his account of the theoretical underpinnings of freedom of speech and press, Meiklejohn
stressed the notion of popular sovereignty and saw restrictions on
free speech as anomalously representing the power of the servant
(the official) to determine what information the master (the people) was to have." If this is correct, then what is wrong with sedi-

themes of this article.
43. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
44. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
the. First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 209 ("[T]he opinion almost literally incorporated Alexander Meiklejohn's thesis that in a democracy the citizen as ruler is our
most important public official."); see also Brennan, The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14-20 (1965)
(discussing the application of Meiklejohn's theories to Supreme Court decisions including
New York Times).
45. A. MEIKLEJOHN. POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 27, 75 (1960). Meiklejohn's position, especially as respects popularly inspired restrictions on speech, is not without difficulty, but those difficulties are not central to my
argument here. See Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 761 (1986).
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tious libel laws or their equivalents is not so much that the laws
constrict information in some abstract sense, or even that they interfere with the process of public deliberation, but rather that they
represent a particularly extreme manifestation of one party's (the
government's) control over the information available to another
(the population), and thus represent, to the extent that knowledge

increases power, an instance of governmental power over the sovereign population. New York Times, therefore, can be seen as a
case not about increasing the availability of politically relevant information to the public so that public deliberations can approach

some supposed ideal, but rather as primarily about (1) the availability of politically relevant information to the public so that they
can exercise more power vis-a-vis their governors, and (2) the impermissibility of the governors exerting power over the governed
by restricting the information available to the governed.

Upon viewing New York Times in this Meiklejohnian light,
Meiklejohn's own town meeting model becomes slightly distracting. Although public deliberation may have independent value, as
the current legal academic articulation of the civic republican tradition emphasizes, 46 a popular sovereignty view of New York
Times sees the essence of the case as involving the increase in
public knowledge of their governors in order that the public might
exercise more control over those governors, or at least be less subject to control by those governors. And this shift of perspective
puts into a different light some of the post-New York Times doctrinal developments. When, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc,4 7
a plurality of the Supreme Court attempted to treat the status (as

46.

See M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITU10-12 (1988) (describing civic republicanism as a tradition based on people
jointly creating and understanding society based on participation with others, hence the
emphasis on town meetings as an institution that instilled civic virtue in citizens);
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1503-04 (1988) (arguing that participation in public deliberation is a primary personal interest as a means of defining norms and
principles); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication,
72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986) (arguing that feminist jurisprudence embraces and adapts civic
republicanism); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29,
85 (1985) (expanding on classical republicanism by studying the cynical attitude of
Madison and the Federalists who adopted certain pluralistic defenses against excesses from
republican participation). Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539
(1988) (discussing the basic republican commitment to political equality, deliberation, universalism, and citizenship and arguing for integration of these concepts into modern republicanism and legal reform).
47. 403 U.S. 29 (1971), overruled in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974).
TIONAL LAW
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public or not) of a defamed individual as irrelevant for defamation
purposes, it adopted a model that focused on the amount of information available for a deliberative body-the town-meeting perspective. But when in Gertz the Court rejected Rosenbloom and
thereby shifted the focus to the identity of the defamed individual,
it adopted a view pursuant to which legal strategies designed to
increase the amount of information that one party has about another become part and parcel of deeper views about the actual and
ideal power relations between those parties.
V
Having begun with the tort of invasion of privacy by the publication of accurate information and moved to increasingly abstract questions about free speech theory and the philosophical
value of truth, I have partially returned to earth by looking a bit
at defamation law in this light. Now I will return to the beginning
and look once more at invasion of privacy.
Assuming that legal doctrine has some effect on behavior, an
assumption probably justified with respect to mass media behavior
in light of legal doctrine concerning privacy and defamation, 48 we
can think about the relationship between privacy law and what
kind of information is being disseminated by whom, to whom, and
with what effect. Thus, part of my claim is that if the law facilitates A having more knowledge about B, then the law necessarily
embodies a position about A's power vis-a-vis B (including A's
power to use B in a fight with C). To create or expand tort actions
for invasion of privacy by virtue of publication of true factual propositions is to empower those to whom we grant the cause of action and proportionately disempower those whom we thus deter.
But where does this take us? It suggests at the outset that it
48. Implicit in the foregoing phrase is my belief that legal doctrine often has less
effect on behavior than is commonly supposed. Were one to read only Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), one might get a distorted view of the amount of
prayer actually taking place in the schools. See K. DOLBEARE & P. HAMMOND, THE

29-33 (1971) (focusing on the degree of noncompliance with the Court's decision in Engel v. Vitale in
regions with strong traditions of religious observance in public schools, but the effect of
changes in doctrine on changes in media behavior appears to be a somewhat closer relationship); Renas, Hartmann & Walker, An Empirical Analysis of the Chilling Effect: Are
SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS: FROM COURT POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE

Newspapers Affected by Liability Standards in Defamation Actions?, in THE
LIBEL ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

COST OF

41 (E. Dennis & E. Noam eds. 1989) (sur-

vey findings that demonstrate evidence of a chilling effect on newspaper editors concerned
with adhering to the New York Times actual malice rule).
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is useful to think of privacy, like power, in terms of control. 49 We

can go further though and ask about the role of this factor in the
design of legal doctrine. Accordingly, we should examine privacy
law by looking at the class of individuals or institutions empowered by an increase in information brought by a relaxation of the
current standard and at whose expense this occurs. Conversely, we
should examine the class comparatively empowered, and at whose
expense, when information transfer is constricted by making invasion of privacy actions more available.
Even if we conclude, as I would, that questions about power
relations among people and institutions are necessarily implicated
in the design of legal doctrine (which is not to take the reductionist position that they are the only questions implicated in the design of legal doctrine) and thus ought to be considered explicitly
in the design of doctrine, we must still consider the size of the
category with respect to which we will consider these questions.
Thus, placing power on the agenda remains agnostic as to whether
this question should be considered at the level of rule-making or
rule-application or both.
Consider in this regard Justice White's dissenting opinion in
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.50 In that case the majority concluded that Lakewood's restrictions on newspaper vending racks restricted the Cleveland PlainDealer's first amendment
rights. Joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, Justice White
chided the majority, stating:
The Court mentions the risk of censorship, the ever-present
danger of self-censorship, and the power of prior restraint to justify the result. Yet these fears and concerns have little to do
with this case, which involves the efforts of Ohio's largest newspaper to place a handful of newsboxes in a few locations in a
small suburban community ...
It is hard to see how the Court's concerns have any applicability here. And it is harder still to see how the Court's image of
the unbridled local censor, seeking to control and direct the content of speech, fits this case. In the case before us, the City of

49.

For a number of different philosophical treatments of privacy, most of which

emphasize the power/control aspects of the concept, see

PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF

PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY (F. Schoeman ed. 1984); Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of
Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
233 (1977). Similar themes emerge in much of the economic analysis of privacy. See The
Law and Economics of Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 621 (1980).
50. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
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Lakewood declined to appeal an adverse ruling against its ban
on newsracks, and instead amended its local laws to permit appellee to place its newsboxes on city property. When the nature

of this ordinance was not to the Plain Dealer's liking, Lakewood
again amended its local laws to meet the newspaper's concerns.
Finally, when the newspaper, still disgruntled, won a judgment
against Lakewood from the Court of Appeals, the city once

again amended its ordinance to address the constitutional issues.
The Court's David and Goliath imagery concerning the balance
of power between the regulated and the regulator in this case is
wholly inapt-except, possibly, in reverse. 51
Undergirding Justice White's intriguing opinion, and partially explaining the fact that Justices Stevens and O'Connor
joined the opinion, is his view that not only are actual power relations relevant, but that those power relations ought to be examined in a particular context. 52 By contrast, one could conclude
that Justice White had identified the correct issue but questions
concerning these power relations should be considered at the
wholesale rather than retail level. By taking this approach, which
I believe is necessarily presupposed by the first amendment itself,53 one could conclude that Justice White had identified the
correct issue but had evaluated its significance at too low a level
of abstraction. Suppose the level of abstraction is raised. The balance of power between governmental regulatory authorities (including but not limited to the City Council of the City of Lakewood) and newspapers (including but not limited to the Cleveland
Plain Dealer) might then be seen as sufficiently on the side of the
government so that governmental restrictions such as those, in
Lakewood would be constitutionally impermissible even if the application of that view, like the application of any rule, was likely
in some cases to be either under- or over-inclusive.
With respect to actions for invasion of privacy, we can thus
ask, in gross, about the power relationships between possessors of

51. 486 U.S. at 792-93 (White, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted).
52. For a commentary on Justice O'Connor's particularism and focus on context, see
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986). For my own discussion and critique of Justice Stevens's even more
extreme particularism, see Schauer, Harry Kalven and the Perils of Particularism(Book
Review), 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 397 (1989). But see Michelman, supra at 8-17, 33-36 (arguing that Justice Stevens, at least in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), demonstrates excess acontexualism and rule-based abstraction).
53. Schauer, The Second Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1
(1989).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:699

information (about themselves) and the class of potential users of
that information. Now that we see the issue as more one of power
than of truth, with even New York Times being much less about

increasing the amount of information than about adjusting the
power relationships between government officials and the popula-

tion or the media, we can understand the plausibility of a focus on
classes of individuals rather than topics. By focusing on actual relations between actual segments of the population, we can draw

more sensible distinctions among, say, public figures, public officials, and private individuals, and avoid distinctions that collapse
54

social roles and focus on different categories of utterance.

Thus, to recognize a right to privacy with respect to true and

previously nondisclosed information is to make a statement about
some number of power relations. Most obvious are those between
public officials and the mass media, between public figures and the
mass media, between private individuals and the mass media, between public figures and the public at large, and between public
officials and the public at large. But most interesting to me is that,
especially with respect to the disclosure to the public of previously

undisclosed accurate information about individual members of
that public, the dimensions of the right to privacy will, or ought to
be, reflective of a view about the relationship between private individuals and the communities of which they are constituent members.55 A newsworthiness standard, as a limitation on that right,

also reflects a view about these questions, as perhaps Oliver Sipple's case 56 makes most clear, that as members of a community
we may at times be called upon to make sacrifices for that community. If neither Sipple nor Sidis57 nor most other privacy liti-

54. 1 intend for this to be somewhat suggestive with respect to defamation, not only
with respect to questions about public figures and the like, see Schauer, Public Figures, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 905 (1984), but also questions about the distinction between media
and nonmedia litigants. On the latter, see generally Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media
Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1978) (the Supreme
Court uses a balancing approach when determining whether first amendment protection
enjoyed by media litigants should be extended to nonmedia litigants).
55. For a commentary on the relation between privacy and individualist and communitarian conceptions of society, see Post, Social Foundations, supra note 15.
56. Oliver Sipple thwarted Sara Jane Moore's attempted assassination of President
Ford and became the focus of extensive media attention. The coverage eventually disclosed
Sipple's homosexuality. The California Court of Appeals found this disclosure newsworthy.
Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1984).
57. Sidis had been a child prodigy. Twenty years later, the New Yorker published a
report of Sidis's decline and obscurity. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Sidis's
complaint. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
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gants wanted to provide information for a public debate, even one
that by hypothesis assisted the process of public deliberation, then
they can be seen as examples of a decision to treat those who happen to be involved in public events as being required to make some
involuntary sacrifice to and for the larger community.
Pursuing this theme of the relationship between privacy and
community somewhat further, we can recall Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 58 In that
opinion he justified eliminating a distinction between private individuals and public figures by observing that "we are all 'public'
men to some degree. ' 59 He then went on to note that "[t]he individual's interest in privacy

. . .

is not involved in this case, . . .

since, by hypothesis, the individual is involved in matters of public
or general concern." 6 0 Under this view, even an individual who
involuntarily or semivoluntarily 6 ' becomes part of an event of public concern is no longer entitled to privacy rights with respect to
that event.
It now appears that the relevant comparison for individuals
about whose lives private facts are reported is with individuals
who are the involuntary targets of the speech of Nazis and members of the Ku Klux Klan, 62 individuals whose athletic efforts were
thwarted by the 1980 Olympic boycott, and individuals who are
conscripted into military service. In each of these examples, the
individual's power over his or her own life is conscripted into a
larger community service. Each of these examples also demon711 (1940).
58.

403 U.S. 29 (1971), overruled in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323

(1974).
59. Id. at 48.
60. Id.
61. The term "semivoluntarily" is meant to raise questions (although not to answer
them) about attempts to focus on an individual's earlier voluntary act as a way of trans-

forming a later involuntary status into a voluntary one.
62. To say nothing of those whose injuries, or deaths, are caused by an agent immune pursuant to the first amendment. See, e.g., Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982) See
generally Diamond & Primm, Rediscovering Traditional Tort Typologies to Determine
Media Liabilityfor PhysicalInjuries:From the Mickey Mouse Club to Hustler Magazine,
10 COMM/ENT. L.J. 969 (1988) (advocating that media torts causing physical injury be

evaluated by traditional tort standards rather than first amendment standards); Schauer,
Mrs. Palsgrafand the First Amendment, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 161 (1990); Comment,
Shouting "INCITEMENT!" in the Courtroom: An Evolving Theory of Civil Liability?,
19 ST. MARY'S LJ. 173 (1987) (exploring the constitutional barriers which prevent the
imposition of civil liability upon authors whose words incite persons to injure themselves or

others).
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strates that the individual's choice to avoid community service,
whether that service be in a war or as an instrument of foreign
policy or as a subject of public deliberation, is treated as less important than or subservient to the larger community interest.
I do not necessarily oppose this phenomenon and on occasion
-have exposed moderately strong communitarian sympathies. 63
Hence, the view that power over the facts of one's life, just like
power over one's body or over one's career or over one's income,
might have to be sacrificed to the public good is one I can well
understand. 64 Yet as with conscription into military service, especially as most recently practiced, we ought to be most wary of any
system of conscription that disproportionately selects the weak
and those who are already socially or politically powerless.65
In dealing with defamation, the Supreme Court has at times
defended its distinction between public and private figures by reference to "access to the channels of effective communication," the
ability of public but not private figures to attract or commandeer
sufficient media attention to be able to reply to a defamatory
statement.66 However, as the Gertz Court itself acknowledged, the
argument from victim access to the channels of communication,
although relevant, can hardly be taken to be sufficient, since the
opportunity to reply, even where actually available, will rarely
have equivalent force to the original defamation. 7 One might
rather look at the "access to the channels of communication" argument in a different light, viewing that factor as a surrogate for
63. See Schauer, Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National Identity, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1504 (1986).
64. The relationship between community and the rules of public discourse is highlighted in Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 15. By focusing on the question of
"matters of public concern," id. at 667-79, Post demonstrates a concern with these same
tensions that preoccupy me here, although it is clear that there is also some tension between his focus on events and deliberation and my focus on the classes of people whose
power must be diminished in order to enrich public deliberation. By focusing on Jerry
Falwell and Larry Flynt, two parties many people consider to be in approximate moral
equipoise, see LeBel, Emotional Distress, the First Amendment, and "This Kind of
Speech'" A Heretical Perspective on Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 60 U. COLO. L. REV.
315, 319 n.17 (1989), Post may have chosen a particularly unsuitable vehicle for conveying
the message of sacrifices (other than just of civility) to be made in the service of public
deliberation.
65. Or, even worse, selects on the basis of factors such as race and gender. On thinking about abortion from a conscription perspective, see Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77
MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1977); Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47
(1971).
66. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
67. Id. at 344 n.9.
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the amount of political and social power that public figures wield.
In other words, distinguishing the public from the private figure
may be a way of acknowledging that if one necessary implication
of defamation law, and the first amendment generally, is the conscription of individuals into the service of public first amendment
values, then there is something to be said for structuring the doctrine so that the burden is placed on those most able to carry it.18
The same considerations could explain a difference between
the public and the private figure with respect to privacy law.
Given that every privacy case presupposes that the actual facts
disclosed were previously private, the question then is whether the
facts disclosed are about someone who was otherwise or previously
public or otherwise or previously private. Under this approach,
disclosure of Oliver Sipple's sexual orientation would be subject to
an evaluation different from that applicable to the unwanted disclosure of the sexual orientation of, say, a United States Senator
or a prominent televangelist. I offer this rough distinction between
public and private, however, only as a first cut, and only because
it tracks a distinction already extant in defamation doctrine. It is
possible, however, that the public figure/private figure distinction
is too crude, failing to draw some attainable and useful distinctions within these classes. Yet even if these are not exactly the
optimal categories or lines to draw, they are at least examples of
categories that recognize that focusing only on "newsworthiness"
or its equivalent comprehends only one side of the equation. Even
if an equivalent amount of public good results from the involuntary disclosure of some private fact about a private individual and
about a public figure, the degree of harm may be different, and
the nature of the power transfer occasioned by that involuntary
disclosure may differ. When we thus recognize that the new-

68. Surprisingly little attention has been paid, either in the cases or in the commentary, to the incidence of the costs of the first amendment. Part of this is due to the tendency in far too much first amendment scholarship to denigrate or ignore the consequences
of speech, thinking that we can ignore the problems of justifying rights to engage in otherregarding and potentially harm-producing activities by supposing those activities to be selfregarding. Yet once we recognize that speech can cause harm, that we protect it not because it is harmless but despite the harm it causes, and that protecting free speech is thus
not a cost-free enterprise, it seems hardly irrelevant in a nonabsolutist world to focus on the
identity of the individuals or classes who bear those costs. These issues are raised by some
number of cases involving the location of speech and suggest that the law ought to be

sensitive, see, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), to questions about whether an
all-too-common means of accommodating the costs of free speech to the mandates of the
first amendment is to move that speech to someone else's neighborhood.
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sworthiness principle stands equally willing to conscript the powerful and the powerless into the service of first amendment values,
we are left to wonder whether this indiscriminate design, and disproportionate impact, is appropriate.
Once we understand, therefore, that the issue is often power
rather than truth, and that the value of truth (or knowledge) often
lies in its being instrumental to some deeper value such as (but
not limited to) power, we can better confront a range of issues
often obscured by existing first amendment doctrines and understandings. We have made a considerable advance by recognizing
(sometimes) that we can evaluate privacy and defamation cases in
ways other than on the basis of whether the result was a victory or
a defeat for the media.6 9 We make more progress when we attempt to be as sensitive in the design of doctrine to the costs of
public deliberation as to the possibility of its constriction. We will
make even further progress when we recognize that the ability of
legal rules dealing with information and knowledge, whether those
rules come under the heading of first amendment, tort, copyright,
patent, or whatever, to generate more knowledge is also but an
intermediate step on the way to considering who will have that
knowledge, at whose expense that knowledge it is gained, and
what, if any, are the social benefits or costs of that shift in power.

69. On this phenomenon, see LeBel, The Good, the Bad, and the Press (Book Review), 1986 DUKE L.J. 1074.

